AMA – Rise of Great Powers Part Deux – Central and Eastern Europe

[u/DonaldFDraper]

n.b. We will be trying something new now. Rather than starting the AMA tomorrow as scheduled, we will be collecting questions and answering tomorrow. So please do not be upset if you haven't had your question answered until tomorrow as we will be waiting until around 10 EST on the 21st of Dec.

After the Thirty Years War, Central and Eastern Europe are quiet. With a terribly destructive war that still lives in the memory of Germans today, the other half of Europe is quiet while France and Britain start their Second Hundred Years War. In this time, we see something else, a rise of Kingdoms rather than nations.

In Central Europe, we see the Habsburgs change. From their multi-kingdom “empire”, they lose their hegemony and suffer a succession crisis that will allow them to strengthen the Austrian Empire. While they fight to hold on to what they have, another power rises to their north.

Mighty Prussia comes from the ashes of the Thirty Years War, renewed by 1700, Prussia will develop an army that will become feared and the model of warfare until the rise of Revolutionary France and Napoleon. While this military system pushes the world away, Prussia starts to chip away at the power and authority of the Holy Roman Empire.

While Prussia rises, Sweden falls. Strong at the end of the Thirty Years War, Sweden will be the major regional power until they push themselves too hard. While down, they’re not out and remain a major regional power that will rise again after the Napoleonic Era.

With the three major powers of Europe, another rises in the model of Europe. With Peter, Russia will go from a minor regional power to one of the greatest European powers of both the era and of all time. While Prussia has fallen, Sweden has lost Finland, and Austria lost her Empire, Russia would endure.

With this, we invite you to ask questions about these four powers.

Here we have:

/u/DonaldFDraper: While my focus is normally in France, the Austrian crown becomes a close ally of France in the later end of the 18th century. Thus I will focus on larger and broader Austrian political history and on the reign of Joseph II. If necessary I will help with Prussia as well.

/u/Itsalrightwithme: My main interest in Early Modern Europe, including the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg empires, and their dominions in Europe and elsewhere. I am happy to answer questions on how Habsburg Austria pivoted its strategic outlook in the 17th and 18th centuries.

/u/k_hopz Is also an Austria focus.

/u/Lubyak focuses on Pre-Revolutionary Austria.

/u/TenMinuteHistory is normally focused on Soviet ballet but has agreed to help with Imperial Russia.

/u/Fandorin has also agreed to discuss Imperial Russia

/u/treebalamb is also here for Imperial Russia.

/u/Facepoundr has also agreed to discuss Imperial Russia

/u/elos_ normally focuses on modern France & Prussia but will focus on Early Modern Prussia here.

Finally, we have our resident Swede, /u/Vonadler whom will talk about Sweden’s role in the world.

Please ask questions concerning Central and Eastern Europe from 1648 till 1789, between the Thirty Years War and the start of the French Revolution.

[u/Elm11]

Hiya, folks! Thanks for doing this AMA.

I have three questions - two military and one social. The first concerns the impact of Gustavian reforms on the militaries of Europe, and the second concerns the perceived decline of the military of France ~1670-1770. The final question concerns the impact of the 30 Years War on society in Germany.

So, firstly, to those of you writing about militaria: The 30 Years War saw sweeping changes in the composition and strategies governing armies, in no small part due to adaptations and refinements implemented by Gustaf Adolph's Swedish Empire. Firstly and more generally, how widely were Gustavian style reforms embraced by other European Powers?

Secondly, and in the specific case of France, the French army under Louis XIV was famed for its capabilities, but my understanding is that the army suffered a decline in capabilities and prestige throughout the late 17th and early 18th centuries. If this perception is correct, what factors lead to this decline?

Finally, and on a different tack: From my experiences studying Germany, the aftermath of the 30 Years War and the destruction it wrought appears to be an integral part of the development of many German states. How did the 30 Years War manifest itself in the cultural identity of Germans in the century following the end of the conflict? Do we see discussion of the impact of the war in literature, art or other cultural outlets? Was there any cultural emphasis on commemorating the war and/or avoiding repetition of its destruction?

Many thanks!

Edit: upon review, I realise that questions about France fall outside the scope of this AMA. Apologies if fielding them was inappropriate, and I'll happily remove them if need be.

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/Elm11]

The Thirty Years' War has had a very strong impact on Germany! Some of the phrases are still known today.

• "ich kenne meine Pappenheimer" -- "I know my Pappenheimer", an Imperial heavy cavalry commander who ALWAYS attacks.

• "Bet, kindlein bet - Morgen kommt der Schwed! der Schwed der kommt mit Ochsenstern, der frisst die kleinen Kinder gern!" -- "Pray, child, pray - tomorrow comes the Swedes! The Swedes who come with Oxenstierna, who likes to eat little children!"

• "Die Schweden sind gekommen / haben alles mitgenommen / Haben's Fenster eingeschlagen / haben's Blei davongetragen / Haben Kugeln draus gegossen / und die Bauern mit erschossen." -- "The Swedes came / and took everything with them / Broke into the window / took away the lead / cast bullets from it / and shot the Farmers with them."

Writings on the Thirty Years' War became prevalent in the 19th century as books such as Gustav Freytag’s Bilder aus der deutschen vergangenheit (Pictures from the German Past) and Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus were used as showcases of how far the new German nation had come from its apparently morbid and barbaric past. This did not happen in a vacuum; Prussian historians used this barbaric state of German past to contrast with the Hohenzollern triumph of 1871. It also went hand-in-hand with the marginalization of German Catholics in that era, which continued to the early 20th century.

Historians and authors alike started to collect memoirs that became collected into narratives of German history. Of course, there was no just one side to the story. Protestant authors focused on the contrast between the destruction of that war that was a cleansing force for past sins, and how the new Germany was to be. Catholic authors lamented the failure of Emperor Ferdinand II's failure to re-unite the empire under Catholic control, and they lamented the eventual rise of Prussia's dominance.

Similarly, Protestant authors built a heroic memory of Sweden's Gustaf II Adolf, writing this into plays and memorials. Catholic authors instead focused on the Swedish torture.

To Protestant authors, the narrative of continuity goes from the Battle of Teutonburgerwald in 9CE (when Germanic tribes defeated three Roman legions), the wars of the Reformation as Luther confronted the corrupt Catholic church, the Thirty Years' War that followed, and then the wars of liberation against Napoleon I of France. It is convenient then to link this to Napoleon III of France, and then to the rise of the new German state.

A great read of this is Kevin Cramer's The Thirty Years' War and German Memory in the 19th Century, ISBN 0-8032-1562-2, 2007.

[u/Bodark43 → u/Itsalrightwithme]

Although the 30 yrs War had a huge impact on German memory as a national disaster, is there any consensus now on how much damage it actually did? Perhaps because I have been overly-impressed with how well German historians do indexes, it seems like one would have generated a disaster map by now, showing which regions were absolutely destroyed, which were unscathed.

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/Bodark43]

This is a really good question and I shall limit my reply to the context of this AMA, which is after Westphalia to before the French revolution.

Estimates of population loss are widely available, even if they are still being debated, the debate being whether it was "horrendous" or "incredible", so I won't address that specifically. What is more interesting is to ask in the context of the military and finance revolutions occurring in that time period, as fiscal-states and trade networks started to grow in a new form.

One of my favorite works is one by Schulze and Volckart of the LSE and ISE respectively, titled The Long-term Impact of the Thirty Years War: What Grain Price Data Reveal, which they explicitly say "do not cite! very preliminary!"

Instead of a demographic study, they focused on an economic study. In particular, how the 30YW affected economic relationships *as reflected in the price of grains (wheat and rye), a very important commodity in that time. What they found is that while the 30YW itself severely disrupted price relations (and by inference, trade networks), there was no lasting effect, and that by 1700 the grain trade network had recovered fully and started to catch up.

This is not to say there was no lasting economic disruption when you look at individual cities, but as a whole the economic integration level recovered by 1700. Notably, some cities suffered tremendously (such as the infamous sack of Magdeburg) while some others moved up in terms of economic competitiveness.

[u/vonadler → u/Elm11]

The reforms of Gustav II Adolf did not exist in a vacuum. His light artillery already existed as cart-mounted swivel guns used by the Hussites and the Cossacks - he (or rather his artillery colonel and later Field Marshal Lennart Torstensson) just put it on light field carriages to be able to move it around.

Likewise his offensive shock cavalry still existed among the Polish and Lithuanian Hussars (which Sweden learned the VERY hard way at Kirkholm 1605).

His infantry system was a development of Maurice of Orange's battalion system.

The question is how much did other European states adapt to the Swedish way of fighting, and how much did they adapt to the Polish-Lithuanian, Dutch and Cossack way of fighting?

The Spanish still won using the old Tercio system at Nördlingen 1634 and by then the Swedish component of the Swedish army was so low that it was no longer possible to use the Swedish brigade formation (which required very well-drilled troops) that was designed specifically to counter the Tercio.

It seems though that from the battle of Wittstock 1638 and onwards, everyone used the Swedish or the Dutch (or a derivate of either) infantry system.

Swedish cavalry seem to have been more offensive minded and more willing to go into melee rather than use the caracoll (or variants of it, such as the Austrian pistol line) all the way through the Great Nordic War (where it repeatedly bested Russian and Saxonian/German mercenary cavalry).

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/Elm11]

Re-post of a prior discussion on the military revolution. There are three aspects highlighted by various authors:

• Dramatic increases in the size of armies, cost of fortifications and sieges. The way battles were fought changed rapidly. Compared to the requirements in raising and maintaining an army of knights or longbowmen -- both in terms of social cost and time -- gunpowder allows recruitment and training from a much larger fraction of the population. Thus, the size of armies grew correspondingly. Many authors such as Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker have pointed to the rise of gunpowder as the enabler of increasingly larger armies and the need for new-style trace italienne fortifications (so-called star forts) as the factors leading to the need to develop a new state model. Rather than pitched battles, sieges and counter-sieges became the most important element of warfare. By the later half of the Thirty Years' War, pitched battles were a rarity as all sides tended to focus on sieges as they realized that winning a pitched battle in and by itself leads to ..... a siege!

• Increasing instances of having to wage war far away from the main power base. This requires a new credit system and standing armies and navies in order to secure the supply of funds from abroad and to secure holdings abroad. For example, the challenge of securing their new world riches is a constant struggle for Spain as the first global colonial power, and also for England and the Dutch as they too rose to global prominence. All states tried their own version of fiscal innovation, from public debts at various levels, non-payments when debts accumulate, the joint-stock companies.

• The need to motivate the elite to enabling the needs of the state. This is an often-understated challenge as western european states moved away from the old system based on feudalism and vassalage into a modern one, something addressed by Jan Glete and his study of fiscal-military states. The first two challenges above can be viewed as change from the top as the state needed to rise to the challenge. It tends to over-state the importance of moving towards an absolutist state such as France. Why then, were both the Dutch and England able to themselves rise to become great powers when they were not ruled by an absolute monarch? The answer is to consider the entire state structure, in particular of the nobles. Nobles of various ranks were given the opportunity to take part in the military and non-military enterprises of the state, as did the rising burghers. To give a comparative example, this period saw minor nobles embarking on military careers and major nobles funding entire enterprises, to a much larger extent than they did before. Ambrosio Spinola raised and funded an entire expeditionary army on behalf of the Spanish Habsburgs. As the local power base of nobles had to give way to further centralization, the state had to give them feasible cost-benefit options. This echoes into Louis XIV's centralization attempts, which were also seen in different variations in other states including both Habsburg and Bourbon Spain.

Now, back to the first aspect which highlights gunpowder weapons, the rise of infantry, and star forts and sieges. Some early authors highlight the Swedish army of the 30YW as the culmination of changes in tactics, in particular Michael Roberts popularized this idea in the English language literature. More recent scholarship has questioned this premise, and highlighted instead several factors.

First is that Sweden benefited from confiscation of church properties as it became a Protestant power, a change from the top largely following Henry VIII's model, leading to significant increase in royal revenue. From here on, it was able to harness a system of soldiery that supplied the early manpower. Later on, it had to rely on a large number of mercenaries. On the other hand, it became completely dependent on French financial support in the 30YW.

It is telling that after the major victory that was Breitenfeld, the road to Bavaria and Austria were open, but Gustav II Adolf had to instead turn right westward onto the fertile Rhinelands, lest his army would starve on its march south. This gave the Imperials and Catholic League the needed breathing space to conduct massive recruiting, re-armament and re-evaluation of tactics at all levels.

A reliable revenue was then of utmost importance, as the hard lessons of the Army of Flanders and the belligerents of the Thirty Years' War were felt strongly by all parties. The ability to raise armies must be matched with the ability to keep that army supplied and paid. To fail in the second part is to risk desertion at best, violence almost always, and mutiny at worst.

Sources:

• J. Glete, "War and the state in early modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1600," ISBN-13: 978-0415226455, 2001.

• F. Tallett, "War and Society in Early Modern Europe: 1495-1715," ISBN: 0415160731, 2010.

[u/[deleted]]

This is a more "meta" question.

What is a Great Power exactly? Who came up with the concept? Were the Ottomans ever considered to be a Great Power?

[u/DonaldFDraper → u/[deleted]]

Well, I chose the words "Great Powers" only because it was the name another flaired user that first tried to organize it, the great /u/elos_. The idea was that this is when the major powers of Modern history, France, Britain, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, The Prussian/German Empire, and Russian Empire all come to the magnitude of power they are during the 19th and 20th centuries.

However, you do bring up a good question, what about the Ottomans? Well I will admit to trying to find an Ottoman focused flair to join us here but couldn't find one. Worse, it would be hard to actually include the Ottomans during this time period.

The Ottoman Empire from 1683 onward is considered the "Sick Man of Europe", slowly being chipped away by Russia and (of all people) Austria. After the second siege of Vienna failed, there was a push back on the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Ottomans were never a threat and only contributed to the empires of Austria and Russia through weakness.

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/DonaldFDraper]

I can answer some questions on the Ottomans, but only in relation to their long rivalry against muh Habsburgs.

The McKay book Great Powers is a good read and I think one very much aligned with the topic of this AMA, albeit in a retrospective way.

[u/h-st-ry-19-17]

Its pretty well known that Maria Teresa hated Frederick the Greats guts with the burning passion of a large sun. But what about Joseph II and his successor and brother Leopold? Did they share their mothers resentment for Prussia and Fredrick II, or since they were young children during the war with Prussia did it not leave much of an impression on them? Thank you!

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/h-st-ry-19-17]

Ah yes, the young Joseph II, who rose to the throne of emperor yet still learning the art of ruling at the knees of his mother Maria Theresia. What a fascinating period it was, what with Frederick the Great being the patron of enlightenment who could have provided a father figure to the young Joseph II whose own father was not exactly a patron of much things worthwhile. This painting of a meeting of the two clearly shows an admiring Joseph II being received by a paternal Frederick II as viewed from a superior Prussian perspective.

More objectively speaking, that period saw a financially ruinous Seven Years' War that left everybody exhausted: the end of that conflict left Prussia and Austria both looking internally and engaging in significant naval-gazing thinking of what went wrong. Maria Theresia's burning hatred of Frederick was partly due to bitterness over the loss of Silesia. Joseph, by most accounts, do not share this attachment to Silesia.

But the rapproachment between Austria and Prussia was due to the menace of Russia. It was not long ago that Russia's Tsarina Elizabeth threatened to erase Prussia's existence. At the same time, Russia was encroaching on a weakening Poland, traditionally an ally of the Habsburgs.

Fearing an upset in the balance of power, Frederick the Great offered a stratagem: that the intractable situation Poland is solved by the partition of that country. Prussia would gain the smaller but wealthier northwest, Russia a vast but unpopulated east, and Austria the manageable southwest.

At the same time, Austria focused more on her western boundary, namely Bavaria, which became a lustful target of acquisition for the rest of Joseph II's career.

[u/h-st-ry-19-17 → u/Itsalrightwithme]

Why was Joseph II unsuccessful in his pursuit to obtain the lands of Bavaria? I know that Catherine the Great threatened to intervene on the side of Prussia, which forced Joseph to the negotiating table, but why did she do this, or even care, seeing as Russia was just coming off the heels of the first partition of Poland not to mention Pugachev? Also how credible is the claim that the War of the Bavarian Succession was the last of the old style cabinet wars of the Ancien Regime? And to cap it all off, how did this affect the politics of the HRE? What was the stance of the Electors? Thank you for this amazing AMA!

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/h-st-ry-19-17]

This is a difficult question to answer because there was underestimation by the belligerents in that conflict.

Joseph II saw Bavaria as his rightful territory, given his marriage Maria Josepha, even if she had deceased by the time of the conflict. He also saw Bavaria as a weakness on Austria's westward flank, as it was the route that had historically exposed Austria to Saxony and to France, and even more recently to Prussia.

When Charles VII HRE emperor and prince-elector of Bavaria died in 1745, he was succeeded by Max Joseph as duke and prince-elector of Bavaria, who then died with no heir in 1777. He was the last of that line of Wittelsbachs. So the inheritance then went to Charles IV Theodore of another branch of the family, the Sulzbach branch.

Normally, this succession would have been fine, except that Charles IV Theodore was also Duke of Berg-Julich, and more notably prince-elector Palatine. Recall back to the 30YW that the Julich succession war, and the resulting deprivation of electoral dignity (temporarily) of Palatine was a major sticking point. So at Westphalia, it was spelled out that no one person could be both prince-elector of Palatine and Bavaria.

Back to Charles IV Theodore and his great (mis)fortune, Bavaria was wealthier but he was loath to cede his Palatine electorate dignity, plus he loved Palatine too much. So Charles II thought he had a good proposal: that the lower Bavaria go to him, in exhange for the parts of the unloved Austrian Netherlands to be given to Charles IV Theodore.

The latter accepted, but his was against the personal ambition of the latter's heir presumptive Charles II August. He preferred the Bavarian duchy at the cost of anything else. He then went to Prussia's Frederick the Great and negotiated what he presented as a preservation of the balance of power. He also brought himself closed to the elector of Saxony and the French. Both were against Charles II's idea.

Frederick II Prussia wanted to preserve the balance of power. Catherine II Russia wanted to preserve the status quo. Frederick August Saxony wanted an integral Bavaria as a buffer. Maria Theresa herself disliked the idea of Charles II. France did not want to be dragged into war lest it threatens her interests elsewhere (notably, North America where he wanted to focus France's strengths).

So when Max Joseph died, both Charles II and Charles II August moved to secure their interest. This meant Austrian troops in lower Bavaria, getting busy setting up a new Austrian governance. Frederick II Prussia found this unacceptable, and mobilized forces near Bohemia. France pulled her commitment from Austria's security, claiming that Austria had brought this upon herself. Saxony quickly aligned herself with Prussia.

All sides started to build up troop formations beyond the hundreds of thousands, as diplomats scurried between Vienna and Berlin. Prussia moved her soldiers into Bohemia, albeit not quickly, as she feared Russia and Sweden to the east and north. Austria was happy to keep the high ground and punish Prussia through artillery bombardment. Fearing a re-run of the 7YW, Maria Theresa opened up communication with Catherine of Russia, asking for diplomatic assistance to force a truce. Catherine forced a cease fire by threatening to send her troops on the side of Frederick, with the understanding that neither party would ever agree to such an arrangement. If she had threatened to enter the conflict on the side of Austria, it could have emboldened Charles. So it was a clever diplomatic move.

So there goes the reason why Charles II failed to acquire lower Bavaria.

[u/DonaldFDraper → u/Itsalrightwithme]

I would like to add that Joseph II is a much different ruler than his mother. Rather than a pragmatist, Joseph was an infinitely hopeful individual that was most likely the most "Enlightened" of the "Enlightened Despots." Through education reforms, economic reforms, reforms of media repression (to the point that he would let freedom of the press in Vienna "[because] the Viennese are happiest when they're complaining."

All of this does happen because of his education during the time of the Enlightenment. With that, he aligns himself with the Enlightenment and thus with Europe's most popular monarch, Frederick the Great. Frederick enacted reforms of his Kingdom to make it "efficient," something that the Kings of Europe looked towards and tried to replicate. As such, Frederick became a small celebrity with nobles, a man changing his kingdom personally.

As such, Joseph and Catherine the great became friends with Frederick. His mother may have hated Frederick, Joseph looked up to him as the cool kid in Europe. Joseph would join Frederick and Catherine during the Third Partition of Poland.

As for Leopold, as a ruler he wouldn't be able to meet Frederick as he would become Emperor in 1790 and Frederick dies four years before.

[u/vonadler → u/[deleted]]

This is a rather interesting subject for the time period.

People identified more with religion, language, crown (ie old lawful rights of their 'nation') and region rather than ethnicity back in those days.

Finns in Sweden were full citizens, with equal representation at the estates parliament and could demand and recieve officials capable of speaking their language assigned to them (although this was not signed into law, it still happened frequently). In 1735 a permanent translation office was established at the estates parliament, allowing Finnish-speakers to adress the authorities in their native language at all levels.

Primary friction within multi-ethnic states of the time were more related to centralisation, old rights and influence within the state rather than ethnicity.

When the monarch and thus the captial was someplace else, local nobility lost influence, and would see nobility from the other country, that were close to the monarch, be appointed to official positions. Centralisation efforts thus often saw foreigners come and attempt to tighten control over the region, which most people resented a lot.

Swedish rule in Estonia and Livonia saw Swedish priests being appointed to local parishes, the local nobility losing the right to 'hand and neck' (to be prosecutor, judge and executioner amonng the serfs of their estate) and Estoniand and Livonians being made equal under the law (at least in theory) as the German burghers and nobility. Combined with the seizing of noble lands during the reductions of Karl XI and the attempts to end serfdom the Swedish rule in Estonia and Livonia was appreciated by the peasants and hated by the German nobility - to the extent that it would much rather see a Russian rule.

[u/facepoundr → u/[deleted]]

Although the census was done far later than the scope of this AMA, there was one done at the start of the Soviet Union in the multi-ethnic regions of the now Poland/Lithuania/Ukraine. What the census asked was essentially "nationality" and by large the people in the countryside wrote "Catholic," "Jewish," or "Orthodox." This is actually a pretty good indicator because the region where they were from was really the periphery of the Russian Empire and very multiethnic. Religion and culture played more part than the nation-state. Now, this is different from the Cossacks which saw themselves as different, especially during the rise of the Great Powers. Cossacks especially would lead a plethora of revolts and rebellions that centered around the periphery, separate rights, and freedom from serfdom. The largest being Pugachev's rebellion in 1773-1775.

Also there was a huge problem on the Caucaus borders with the Muslim minority in places such as Chechnya. This was fed by the Ottoman Empire, which Russia had a feud with since its formation, essentially.

However, a lot of it did come down to religion more so than just nationalities.

[u/DonaldFDraper → u/[deleted]]

I am sorry but the 19th century and WW1 are outside of the focus of this AMA, we are talking about Europe from 1648-1789.

[u/Cageweek]

Thanks for doing this AMA. I just have a few questions regarding Sweden. What caused Sweden to become a great power? What militarily made them stand out? How did they compare against other great powers, ex. Austria, France?

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/Cageweek]

In the English language, the use of Sweden's army in the 30YW as a showcase of the so-called military revolution started with Michael Roberts' seminal paper in the 1960s. This is a large topic that I attempted to address here. Specifically on the military comparison of Sweden and other powers at a time, several things are of note. Rather than replying to /u/vonadler 's post I will add several things that I think are worth mentioning.

1. Sweden's reformation was controlled from the top. Gustaf Vasa followed Henry VIII of England's model, whereby he first insisted on his choice of archbishop, and then broke completely from Pope Clement VII. At the same time, church wealth and properties were confiscated and the practice of the church was changed gradually. This gave immense wealth in the 1500s, which was used to guarantee Sweden's state integrity and was used to invest in her military. Over time, they became useful sources of revenue as royal lands comprising some of these confiscated properties could be pawned off or sold off.

2. Sweden's entry and participation in the 30YW was very dependent on French financial support. It can be said that the French proposal came at the perfect time. The Swedish army was just handed a heavy defeat at the hands of the Polish-Imperial army in 1629, from which the Swedish King Gustaf Adolf II barely escaped with his life. The French had lobbied for Bavaria to break against the Imperial army, but failed. Their former ally Denmark refused to continue its war. Gustaf Adolf II was eager to extricate himself from the war against Poland, so he signed a six-year truce where he conceded territorial control but earned the very-important toll revenue of all ships calling at ports of Poland and Prussia. This ended up being a third of Sweden's revenues. So as she entered the 30YW, Sweden had an experienced body of troops, a well-organized state.

Some sources.

• Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook, ISBN 978– 0– 230– 24205– 0, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

• Geoffrey Parker, The "Military Revolution," 1560-1660--a Myth? The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 195-214.

[u/vonadler → u/Itsalrightwithme]

I'd like to say that the French subsidies, that never exceeded 500 000 riksdaler, was insignificant compared to the land rents, tolls and rents from the Prussian ports taken during the Livonian wars, held by Sweden 1629-1635.

The ordinary rents and tolls from Sweden, Estonia, Ingria and Livonia was about 1 700 000 riksdaler per year 1630.

The East Prussian tolls and rents yielded roughly 1 500 000 riksdaler yearly until they were returned in 1635.

The cost of the army in East Prussia, building up for intervention in the war, was roughly 3 000 000 riksdaler 1630.

As you can see, it was East Prussian tolls and rents, regular Swedish state income and plunder that kept the Swedish army in Germany going much more than the French subsidies. Although the latter surely helped, they were a small part of the total sum.

Edit: When studying sources counting the money, it is important to remember that Sweden had two currencies that had a different value and that authors often mistake them. 1 riskdaler (value based in silver) = 1,625 daler (value based in copper).

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/vonadler]

Indeed, the French subsidy was small compared to other income, but that subsidy came at a very important time for Sweden, as Sweden had to support more men at farther away locations.

The year 1630 saw Sweden spend more than its revenue, but it didn't go enough to pay all these troops. The Baltic provinces were not able to further maintain such large armies of occupation, to quote Swedish reports they were "laid waste".

In this era it is very important to view exactly how different funds could be spent, rather than on aggregation of funds which can mislead. This was the hard lesson learned by Charles V as he teetered from crisis to further crises across his empire in Europe and elsewhere.

Edit: Swedish setback in Magdeburg, leading to the city's sack in 1631, was blamed on the city's unwillingness to pay for Swedish troops to be mobilized. Gustav II Adolf's letters and declarations mention "fixed contributions, either to the expenses of war or troops, to be maintained at the charges of each members" as he refers to his intended alliance.

Finally, even following its victory at Breitenfeld, Sweden had to re-iterate its needs to France, explicitly stating that Sweden required from the King of France 400,000 Imperial thaler each year, which had to be paid on the continent, such that it was more convenient for payment of troops.

[u/vonadler → u/Cageweek]

1. Sweden was strongly centralised and despite being less populated and thus poorer, it was able to use its resources better than most other powers of the era.

2. Sweden had a lucky streak of strong warrior kings that were also skilled aministrators. Combined with a rather weak nobility, of which many were well-educated but reliant on state positions as administrators, officers and diplomats. All this meant a for the time well-run state that could focus outwards rather than on internal conflict.

3. At the time, many of its enemies were either far away or had other problems. Swedish core territory never faced any serious invasion between 1613 and 1711 and even then the richest and most populous parts never face strife. Russia was weakened by the times of troubles in the early 1600s and remained less technologically and organisationally advanced until Peter the Great. Denmark turned out to be the weaker part of the death struggle between Sweden and Denmark. Germany and the Emperor were severely weakened by the 30 years' war and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in political decline and suffering decentralisation.

4. Militarily Sweden stands out for its semi-proffessional troops, its allotment system (indelningsverket), its excellent light artillery, its proficiency for manouvre warfare, where the Grodno campaign is the pinnacle and its excellent and very offensive minded cavalry.

[u/Cageweek → u/vonadler]

Thanks for answering my question!

[u/BbAaLlLlSs]

You talk about Sweden as a declining power, but what about the decline and eventual dissolution of Poland-Lithuania?

How was a major player that largely stayed out of the 30 years war (if not other conflicts, particularly with Moscovy and Sweden) grew weaker over the period - would Poland-Lithuania not be in a 'better' starting position than say Prussia?

How useful is this example as a counter point in examining the 'rise' of neighbouring great powers?

To what extent is the land-grab of Poland-Lithuania a driver for the growth in the rising great powers in Eastern Europe?

Turns out I can't format to save my life.

[u/facepoundr → u/BbAaLlLlSs]

Its easy to almost get in a mindset of a Real-Time Strategy game when thinking about the Great Powers during this period. That Russia/Muscovy had a better starting location, but was hampered by a slow moving system of building power. But that kind of neglects the intricacies of all the different movements throughout the time.

The elephant, or rather bear, in the room is obviously Russia. After tossing off the Mongol yoke and subsequent expansion through the lands that were left over by the Mongol power vacuum, Russia was really the bear. On top of which it had a centralized power structure and it crushed any ideas of nobility leadership after the Time of Troubles, where incidentally enough the Polish-Lithunia Commonwealth had ruled Moscow for a period.Although the autocratic rule would present issues later on which... went badly, in this time it meant that the foibles that Poland was not an issue in the autocratic Russia as much.

This actually segways into why Russia, Sweden, and Prussia gobbled up Poland and Lithuania and it had to do with political strife in the Commonwealth as well as the rise of three Great Powers. ( annnnnd cut! ). There just wasn't a preparedness of Poland for internal strife that was the catalyst of the fall of the Commonwealth. With the Cossack uprising and the Russian invasion which the led to the Swedes invading, it was a just a slow tumble downwards. A lot of it could be tied to poor leadership, poor planning, and just petty squables within the Commonwealth. To be fair, the Commonwealth did rule over an increasingly diverse population, with Jews, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Protestants, all calling home in their borders. However, it led to a slow tumble which basically cost the Commonwealth its title as a Great Power by the end after a series of Unfortunate Events kept happening in the 17th century.

[u/BbAaLlLlSs → u/facepoundr]

I was a little reluctant to use the term 'starting position' for exactly this reason. But as I understand your reply, broadly there were greater systemic problems with the commonwealth (I have only a passing understanding of the Sjem and its problems) that are more of a factor than managing to largely stay out of destructive conflicts a la the 30 years war?

[u/BbAaLlLlSs → u/BbAaLlLlSs]

I am actually struck a little by the similarities between Russia and the commonwealth here - diverse populations spread over large territory, low population density, internal problems with powerful magnates/internal strife, low levels of development compared to more western powers, continued serfdom, shared borders with aggressive Sweden...

Given this, why do you think Russia grew and swallowed Poland, and not vice-versa? I am not sure I get a sense of this from your answer.

[u/Goat_im_Himmel]

Was there such thing as a "Pan-German Identity" in the 16th-18th centuries, or was this mostly a product of the 19th century? If so, how did it compare to that of the Wilhelmine era onwards, and if not, how did the various Germanic-speakers view their relation to each other?

[u/GibeMoneiPl0x]

Ok, so first things first, thanks for doing this AMA!

Now let's get down to business, but before asking my question I want to explain why I'm asking it. So basically my history professor (a person who I admire and think very highly of) used to tell us that in Imperial Russia an actual bourgeoisie never came to be, unlike in England, France or The Netherlands. So my question is, how true is this statement? And if it is, was there a social class in Russia that even remotely resembled the bourgeoisie?

And last but not least, why did this social class not exist in Russia (if it didn't exist)?

EDIT: To clarify, I mean during Peter the Great's reign.

[u/facepoundr → u/GibeMoneiPl0x]

The question itself is wrong. Now, I don't mean that as an insult, but the way its framed is wrong because of history.

First off, we should step back and realize what the bourgeoisie means. In Marxist terms it means a class or people that own the "means of production." Means of Production means the the capital (money) and assets (factories, property, tractors, trains, etc) to produce things.

Now, we can look back and realize that bourgeoisie in general around the world did not exist anywhere in the period of Peter the Great. The bourgeoisie really didn't rise to prominence until the 19th century. Especially around the rise of the Industrial Revolution and coincidentally when Marx was writing about the bourgeoisie.

Now, if we go beyond the scope of this AMA then yes, there is some credence to what your History Professor is speaking of. There is one other aspect though too. Russia had a weak nobility, or non-existent when compared to the other Great Powers at this time. The Russian nobility was dependent on the Crown for everything. In the 15th and 16th centuries the nobility didn't even "own" their own property instead it belonged to the Crown and was lended to the nobility for their use, but could be revoked at any time. This was later abolished, but the weakened nobility remained. Serfdom in a way also made sure that the nobility would remain weak and without capital for vast stretches as well.

Therefore, although the bourgeoisie did not exist the proto-bourgeoisie were already weakened and would in essence lead to a weakened bourgeoisie in the 19th and 20th centuries.

[u/GibeMoneiPl0x → u/facepoundr]

Thanks for this really detailed answer, the issue seems far clearer to me now!

[u/facepoundr → u/GibeMoneiPl0x]

There is a lot more information about the lack of the bourgeoisie class in Russia during the 19th and 20th centuries and it ties in with Leninism and eventually the formation of the Soviet Union itself.

[u/GibeMoneiPl0x → u/facepoundr]

Still, you answered my question, and especially since you pointed out that it was flawed, there wasn't much to say and there was no answer to the other two questions, so I'm pretty satisfied that I have one less misconception about Russia (plus it's always nice to have some background information and to know more about the bigger picture)!

[u/IorekHenderson]

Will you do an AMA about America's involvement in the war as well?

[u/DonaldFDraper → u/IorekHenderson]

I am sorry but this isn't an AMA on the Seven Years War but rather Central and Eastern Europe. It may be something I will look at doing in the future.

[u/IorekHenderson → u/DonaldFDraper]

Oh my apologies, best of luck mates!

[u/kardanadam]

I would like to ask a rather broad question: What were the main reasons that resulted an Austrian dominance over German hinterland before Prussia? Only the Habsburg connection seems like not enough to me.

Also, for Russia was it possible an earlier expansion towards Balkans and Ottoman Empire land's without confronting Great Britain?

[u/facepoundr → u/kardanadam]

For the Russian portion, no not really.

Russia did care about the Balkans and it led its policy in the 19th century. However, Russia slowly began to get there through conquest in the 18th century. With the two Russo-Turkish wars in the 18th century as well which led to Russia gaining ground past the Dnieper River and the Crimean Peninsula in 1774.

Russia could not truly afford to push into the Balkans before the reign of Catherine the Great because of other issues closer to home. The Great Northern War during Peter the Great's time, the dismantling of the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the conquering of the lower Volga all took precedent before looking at the Dying Man of Europe and his holdings. Russia did begin piecing out the Ottoman Rule in Europe but not until the 18th century where there was two big wars with the Ottomans which led to Russia gaining vast swathes of land in the region. But the other Great Powers always propped up Ottoman rule to prevent Russia from gaining too much, for fear of the "balance of power." This is why the British were always kind of involved in the peace treaties because Britain feared the balance of power tipping too far in Russia's favor in the Balkans and especially feared Russian control of Istanbul and by extension the Dardanelles. Be it because of trade, or because then Russia would have a warm water port and freedom to exploit it into the Mediterranean Sea.

[u/Itsalrightwithme → u/kardanadam]

German hinterland

Can you explain exactly what you mean by "hinterland" please? If you are asking about Silesia, it was part of another lucky Habsburg inheritance. The Crowns of Bohemia came to Ferdinand I of Austria's hands in 1520s due to the demise of king Vladislas' only son Louis at the Battle of Mohacs. Ferdinand was married to a Bohemian princess and his brother Charles V supported his claim to the crown. Not all was well as many nobles were Protestants (either Lutheran or Ultraquist), and when they revolted, Ferdinand's victory allowed him to consolidate power there.

[u/kardanadam → u/Itsalrightwithme]

By german hinterland, I meant the lands ruled by German principalities and Austria. Territories of first Reich as a whole.

[u/Lubyak → u/kardanadam]

Well, it's important to draw a distinction between the lands of the Holy Roman Empire--which the Habsburgs only ever had indirect control over--and the lands of what gets labeled 'Austria' on the map, but is really just the sum total of the Habsburg's hereditary lands, which includes Upper, Lower, Interior and Anterior Austria; the lands of the Bohemian Crown; and Hungary. These territories were gathered by inheritance, and formed the core of the Austrian Habsburg's power. Their dominance over this--while often challenged--was based on the fact that they were the direct rulers of these lands.

The wider Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation is a different story. The Habsburgs never truly 'dominated' this territory, in spite of their practically uninterrupted reign as Emperor throughout the Early Modern. The Emperor was widely respected, but the nature of Imperial government structures and what not, as well as the strong belief of the German princes in their own liberties limited their ability to rule such territory without consent from the Princes via the Diet (Reichstag). As for why the Habsburgs were continually elected, it is important to remember that they were standouts amongst the Princes of the Empire in terms of power. The Austro-Bohemian lands were quite wealthy, and rule of both meant that they were a step above even powerful Imperial princes like the Duke of Bavaria or the Elector of Saxony. Since the Emperor's duties were heavily tied to the defence of the Empire against external threats, and the Emperor was expected to foot much of the cost of such wars themselves, the apparent wealth of the Austrian Habsburgs made them a fine choice. Not to mention, a well placed bribe would not be misplaced when it came to ensuring that the electors would vote for the Habsburg Archduke of Austria.

Hopefully this helps answer your question, and feel free to ask any followups.

[u/Poulern]

Might as well ask since it seems so obvious. For those of you who have played it, what is your opinion on empire total war? I am more curious about if it does the overall strategic situation justice, or is a fantasy scenario thought up by game designers.

[u/DonaldFDraper → u/Poulern]

Politically, it's lacking in terms of diplomacy as diplomacy was far more convoluted and secretive than the game mentions. Worse, the various regions are far more complex and smaller, with the Holy Roman empire having Free Cities, small principalities, and other nonsense that the HRE was made up of.

In terms of combat, it's... right... Linear warfare focused on the supremacy of the line and training rather than tactics. Everything moves slow, cavalry and artillery are generally ineffective and slow, and infantry are the most important thing. I remember fighting people who had only twenty Prussian lines rather than a full army and steamroll over people. Of course it doesn't reflect the proper dynamic of dynastic warfare but... it's okay.

Napoleon Total War is a superior TW game and it perfectly displays the relationship of each arm of the army and how they work.

Edit: In NTW, Britain is OP, Pls nerf.