California to Negotiate Trade With Other Countries to Bypass Trump Tariffs

[u/sweatycat]

https://www.newsweek.com/california-newsom-trade-trump-tariffs-2055414

[u/jeebus87]

You are absolutely correct that the Constitution draws clear lines, international trade, foreign affairs, the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, these powers are unmistakably delegated to the federal government under Article I, Section 8. And yes, the framers were deliberate in that design, not only to present a unified front in international dealings but also to prevent economic fragmentation among the states.

But here is where the tension lies. While the authority to regulate international trade rests squarely with the federal government, the consequences of those regulations fall unevenly across the states. When a sweeping federal tariff policy disproportionately harms certain states, say, California’s agricultural or tech sectors, it is not unreasonable for those states to attempt to shield their residents from the economic fallout, even if their tools are limited.

You are also right that some issues must be federal. But when federal action produces harm, and state-level mitigation is met with resistance, it strains the credibility of appeals to federalism in other contexts. The hypocrisy arises not from a failure to understand constitutional boundaries, but from watching those boundaries expand and contract based on political expediency.

So yes, the framers gave international trade to the federal government. But the federal government must wield that authority with a sense of shared national stewardship, not as a blunt instrument that ignores the real, localized damage it inflicts. Otherwise, the states will understandably fight for breathing room, even if the Constitution gives them precious little of it. And that, too, is part of the ongoing American story.

[u/DiabolicallyRandom → u/jeebus87]

I'm all for multiple paragraphs, but none of this changes the realities. This is against the law. Being mad about it won't change that and the fed is permitted to enforce that law, including through use of force.

The tension creates political problems, not legal ones. The law is clear.

[u/doyletyree → u/DiabolicallyRandom]

I agree with each of you.

The bottom line, from where I sit, is that the law directs the Fed to handle trade; end of that particular story.

The other reality is the seeming contradiction of power-application and the seeming prerogative of states to react accordingly.

I don’t believe that these are contradictions of behavior by the administration. Instead, it’s simply an aberration, even phase-shift, of application precedent.

The administration says x, then does y to some. That’s not a contradiction of behavior; it was expected. It’s different, sure, but until a court strikes orders or until a new constitution is written, the best we can say is “This is now how it is. This is how these words can now be applied.”

Moreover, the enforcement of the law is clear; state can’t just throw a fit and invalidate it as they don’t have the power. So, again, while it may seem like a crack to exploit, it’ll e a tough row to hoe for making a case that all states should have this power equally.

You could argue that the administration is wrong; worst case scenario for them: they’re ruled against, they stop and switch tactics, and go on. There’ll always be loyal staff to serve as patsies if need be.

[u/jeebus87 → u/doyletyree]

You are correct that the Constitution expressly vests the federal government with the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. That provision is clear, and no serious argument disputes it. However, to conclude that this ends the discussion is to conflate legal authority with political legitimacy. The question is not whether California may draft trade treaties. It may not. The question is whether a state, bearing the brunt of national policy, may seek to protect its constituents through lawful and adaptive responses. Jurisdictional exclusivity does not extinguish political consequence. When federal action imposes disproportionate harm, states have not only the prerogative but arguably the duty to advocate for relief. This is not rebellion. It is governance in its most responsive form.

The assertion that any contradiction in the administration’s posture is only apparent overlooks the broader implications of how power is rationalized and deployed. When an administration defends one state’s authority to restrict fundamental liberties under the banner of federalism, and then reflexively rejects another state’s attempt to respond to federal economic harm, the inconsistency is not theoretical. It is demonstrable. It is not enough to say precedent is evolving. The problem is not evolution. It is selective application. That is what corrodes the integrity of federalism.

Framing this as a phase shift in application precedent merely obscures the stakes. If precedent is nothing more than a temporary application of power, contingent on political utility, then it ceases to be precedent at all. It becomes performance. If constitutional interpretation is reduced to expediency, then the rule of law is subordinated to the will of those in office. This is not a system of checks and balances. It is the erosion of legal coherence.

Claiming that inconsistency is expected is, ironically, an admission of the dysfunction that critics identify. Normalizing incoherence in governance does not excuse it. On the contrary, it institutionalizes cynicism. When erratic governance becomes accepted as standard practice, public trust dissolves, and constitutional design loses its foundation.

No one is suggesting that states may nullify federal law. California is not seeking to invalidate tariffs or undermine federal supremacy. It is navigating the narrow legal boundaries available to it, petitioning trade partners, requesting exemptions, and signaling the disproportionate impact of national policy. This is not insubordination. It is participatory federalism. When Washington exercises its lawful power in ways that inflict severe local damage, states must retain the capacity to respond with advocacy, diplomacy, and lawful resistance. To demand that they remain silent is to confuse compliance with consent.

This is not about granting states unlimited discretion in foreign policy. It is about recognizing the political, economic, and human cost of blunt national policymaking. When such policies are enacted without regard to regional variation, states with complex, interconnected economies will naturally seek relief. That response is not unlawful. It is the predictable result of a union that balances national power with local representation.

To say that the administration may simply adjust its strategy after being ruled against is a description of procedural flexibility, not a defense of its actions. A government’s readiness to abandon one unlawful course in favor of another does not cleanse the original misuse of power. It compounds it. In a constitutional republic, the measure of legitimacy is not what a government can get away with, but whether it governs within principled constraints. That is not sentiment. That is the foundation of lawful self-government.